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Charles Tart (1990) has presented an intriguing set of
proposals for extending the use of computer-generated vir-
tual realities (VR) to concepts like p(ffSonality, alter personali-
ty, and state of consciousness. In essence, he feels that newer
multi-sensory technologies are capable of artificially creat-
ing or reproducing certain experiences in subjects. Drawing
on ingenious adaptations ofVR in flight simulation designs
like the Link Trainer, Tart undertakes to extrapolate from
aeronautics to the more elusive realm of clinical phenome-
na. As if to emphasize how broadened a notion VR actually
is, he assures us we all "already live in a variety of internally
generated virtual realities" (Tart, 1990, p. 227), without real-
izing it. An example ofsuch a personal and uncontrived ana-
logue offlight simulation models is, according to Tart, illus-
trated in an experiment in which an adventitious relationship
between a visual display (lights) and music is perceived by
subjects as beautifully synchronized. In this case, our per-
sonal VR functions to create a phenomenal synchronywhere
none actually exists. (Tart's point may also be illustrated by
anyofa number ofcommon phenomena that do not involve
cross-modality paradigms, such as the experience of appar-
ent motion in stroboscopic movement [Rock, 1975].)
Tart's extended discussion of our personal VR, howev-
er, ventures into the limbo of metaphysics:
'The accepted modern understanding.. .indicates that
we do not experience the outer world directly but
indirectly. Various physical energies like light and
soundare not experienced directly. Rather, they cause
electrochemical changes in various receptor
organs...given the widely accepted psychoneural
identity hypothesis that consciousness is equivalent
to and nothing but these electrochemical processes
in the nervous system, what we experience is not the
world per se but processed neural abstractions.
Although these neural events are initially related to
external world events, this relationship may be great-
ly altered by the time we deal with the final neural
even ts comprising consciousness." (Tart, 1990, p. 227)
Tart's sympathies in the foregoing passage are with two
philosophical positions: identity theory and Kantian meta-
physics. The latter presupposes we cannot have direct knowl-
edge of the external world, but only a filtered access to it,
colored by receptor processes. It is something of a mystery
why Tart feels neural identity theory renders reality-access
indirect. If consciousness is for Tart identicalwith processes
in a materialistic medium, one could as well envision an even
more direct access to the external world than is provided by
alternative formulations of the mind-body relationship.
It is perhaps premature to grant the mind-brain identi-
ty thesis the currency Tart claims for it. The "theory" is a
hotly contested network of conceptual issues within mod-
ern philosophy (Borst, 1970), including one as to whether
it qualifies as being, strictly speaking, a hypothesis at all. For
example, critics like Malcolm (1970) challenge neural iden-
tity theory as a legitimate scientific hypothesis. He argues
that since its defenders provide for a sense of strict identity
between consciousness and brain processes, conditions
essential for its confirmation cannot be satisfied. One such
condition for strict identity is "occurs in the same place at
the same time" (Malcolm, 1970, p. 175). Obviously, any such
confirmation would require independent determinations of
both the conscious event and the neural process held to be
identical with it, as well as the further test of seeing whether
they both occurred in the same place. However, conditions
for conducting the further test cannot even be formulated
for the conscious event. Malcolm's critique of neural iden-
tity theory, whatever its shortcomings, is butone entry among
many others in recent years.
Be that as it may, where under older accounts Tart's
"processed neural abstractions" becomes "confinementwith-
in the circle of our own sensations" (Pap, 1949, p. 144), in
Kant they become a world of phenomena forever blocking
our direct access to noumena, the world as it really is. In effect,
we are, according to Tart, forever imprisonedwithin an organ-
ismic VR, making our relationship to reality considerably less
than flat-footed. It is an old story, discussed for decades by
leading epistemologists (Price, 1932; Pap, 1949; Ayer, 1956;
Austin, 1963; Hamlyn, 1970). Tart is correct in likening the
story to a "movie theatre of our own, lost in the show creat-
ed by the usually hidden mechanisms ofthe World Simulation
Process" (Tart, 1990, p. 227). Except he believes it.
That something is amiss in Tart's extrapolation from
flight simulation models is apparentwhen he graduates them
into analogues counterposed between us and reality. The
analogy breaks down because, in the aeronautical examples,
straightforward comparisons between simulators and the real
world can in principle be made. The situation is utterly dif-
ferent for comparisons between the "real" world and those
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collections of neural abstractions Tart deems us all to be. If
we are forever insulated from "the world per se" (Tart, 1990,
p. 226) ,we are logically, not merely technologically, debarred
from investigating comparisons ofthe latter kind. Accordingly,
these comparisons cannot be expressed as coherent scien-
tific claims. On the other hand, Tart's "Lori Lite" example
presupposes an intelligible meaning for the notion ofa per-
sonal VR, because the illusion of synchronization of light
and sound can be studie,d against a backdrop of specifiable
stimulus conditions. Indeed, the very notion ofan "illusion"
like the one produced by Lori Lite has meaning precisely
because the relationship between light and sound patterns
is an adventitious one. That it is not perceived this way by
subjects is the "illusion" in question. No such comparison is
even possible between our personal VR and the pervasive
reality itpresumably misrepresents. Ifso, the claim our recep-
tor systems fundamentally distort or transform an occult real-
ity beyond all recognition is a metaphysical, not scientific
one. In summary, if there is no conceivable way for us to
access "reality" directly, how do notions like "distortions of
reality" get a foothold in the realm ofcoherent claims when
comparisons are made between the real world and our pro-
cessed information about it?
I confess to some apprehension over Tart's VR applica-
tions to clinical contexts in which "you could observe your
client's reactions in a computer-generatedvirtual realitymuch
more directly by donning your own Eye Phones™'' (Tart,
1990, p. 231). My trepidation does not spring from any fan-
cied mismating between the needs of a vulnerable popula-
tion and Tartean technology perse (acknowledgement ofthe
human factor and ethical issues about adaptations to clini-
cal populations are an overriding concern ofTart's) . All the
same, Tart's first example of prospective applications is to
paranoid patients-a population one would expect to be
low on any list of priorities for who should commence .,wet
runs into Buck Rogers-type experiences! ' . ,
"Suppose your client has strong paranoid tenden-
cies, for example. We could program a virtual reali-
ty to reflect that. ..we might have the computer dark-
en the shadows in the room, for instance, and have
ambiguous motions occur in the shadows. Then we
might have the computer modifY the facial expres-
sions of the virtual people in the room (including or
not including you, the therapist, if your virtual body
is present in the scene) to make them look more
threatening. Perhaps we could program this com-
puter-generated reality so that no matter which way
you turn in it, there is occasionally something mov-
ing in the periphery ofyour vision that you c;m never
get a good look at. Can you now understand your
client's reality better?" (Tart, 1990, p. 231).
In a word, no. Tart's paranoid VR seems less designed
to reflect or assess paranoia than to induce it anew. Maybe
this is because rather crucial questions arise at the initial
level ofsoftware design in simulating "paranoid perception."
For example, a VR program articulating a world in which
ambiguously perceived objects move in the peripheryofvision
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may be technologically achievable, but what does it have to
do with paranoia? Tart opts for programming illusory or hal-
lucinatory perceptual fields he constr.ues as ingredients of
paranoid states, whereas these contrastwith a delusionalworld.
Visual alterations of the real world such as are implied by
"darkened shadows," "ambiguous motions," and "modified
facial expressions" presumably contrast with veridical per-
ceptions of it. Since the delusional component in all para-
noid systems affects interpretation rather than visual orga-
nization, it is questionable whether Tart's paranoid VRs are
valid renditions of the experiential world of this patient pop-
ulation. Unless the core pathology is compounded by types
of schizophreniform symptoms, paranoids are not ordinar-
ily subject to sensory experiences differing from those asso-
ciated with normal functioning. Tart's paranoid VR se~ms
to be an arbitrarily concocted world; one in which techno-
logically contrived stressors are more abundant than they
are in the real world of the paranoid.
In another sense, however, Tart's paranoid VR seems
apt, only not as a way of reproducing a patient's actual per-
ceptions. The system may actually be a programmed reality
in which a normal person would begin to feel paranoid. But
its effect on real paranoids, I fear, would only be to poten-
tiate, rather than reproduce, an already hypervigilant exis-
tence.•
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